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We investigate how the effect of competition on price discrimination varies 
depending on the level of quality provided by companies in the hospitality 
industry. Our findings reconcile conflicting results of previous literature on 
this topic. Namely, we provide strong empirical evidence that competition 
affects differently the price of single and double rooms of hotels with greater 
quality versus those with lower quality. In the presence (absence) of 
differentiation, competition increases (decreases) price discrimination. Our 
findings are robust to the use of econometric techniques that alleviate 
endogeneity concerns.      
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1.  Introduction 
 
One of the better-established rules in Economics indicates that greater product market 
competition should decrease price levels. However, such a general idea needs further 
qualification when we proceed to study the influence of market competition on intra-firm price 
menus. Market competition may affect asymmetrically the various prices that any given firm 
commands for its different products or services, and extant theoretical models claim opposite 
predictions regarding whether low or high prices are going to be more affected by an increase in 
competition (Stole, 1995; Rochet and Stole, 2002). In fact, the scarce empirical literature on this 
topic has reported conflicting evidence; Borenstein and Rose (1994) find that product 
competition affects relatively more the lowest airline fares, while Busse and Rysman (2005) 
show that competition impacts relatively less the lower priced advertisements in the yellow 
pages market. More recently, some of the empirical findings have been questioned due to 
possible omitted-variable bias from cross-sectional studies (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009). 
In this paper we investigate an initial intuition in Busse and Rysman (2002) and provide 
evidence that the linkage between competition and the firms’ possibility to price discriminate 
critically depends on firm differentiation. Although firm differentiation is a somewhat 
ambiguous term, we follow a traditional conceptualization and consider differentiation strategies 
as those product features purposely designed to shift consumer preferences and increase 
consumers’ willingness to pay higher prices, such as product quality (Chamberlin, 1933; Beath 
and Katsoulacos, 1991). In a nutshell, we find in our study that when firms pursue a 
differentiation strategy, then higher competition affect proportionally more the lowest prices 
charged by each firm in line with Borenstein and Rose (1994); on the contrary, when firms are 
not differentiated, then we find that the highest prices are the ones relatively more squeezed by 
competition, as shown by Busse and Rysman (2005). 
We empirically document this relationship using panel data from the Spanish hospitality 
industry. This industry is an excellent framework to test this hypothesis for several reasons. First, 
in this complex market we can observe at the same point in time companies that compete with 
widely distinct product quality, as reflected by the number of stars that an official agency assigns 
to each hotel. Second, market competition varies across locations and we can exploit both across 
time and across location variation of competition. Third, all hotels have a standard pricing policy 
that distinguishes between single and double use room prices and therefore it allows us to 
identify the intensity of second degree price discrimination pursued by each hotel. Fourth, the 
Spanish context represents an ideal laboratory to study competition and pricing policies because 
of the size and importance of Spain as a touristic destination, which allows us to obtain a rich 
dataset with a large number of observations in markedly different locations. Finally, Spain is a 
highly decentralized country in which the relevant regulatory competencies depend on the 
regional governments, so that we can exploit distinct regulatory regimes to identify exogenous 
variation in competition.  
We start by documenting how our two measures of competition, number of hotels in each 
location and the resulting Herfindahl index, are indeed negatively correlated with prices for 
single and double rooms. Next, we move on to see how competition determines the possibility of 
firms to discriminate the prices they charge for their product offer. Indeed, we show how product 
competition impacts asymmetrically single and double room prices, thus changing firms’ ability 
to price discriminate. We see that for hotels pursuing a strategy of quality differentiation, an 
increase in market competition leads to an increase in the distance between single and double IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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room prices, while the exact opposite happens for hotels with lower quality; this finding 
constitutes the main result of the paper. These results are confirmed using both interactions and 
subsample analyses for price levels as well as straightforward measures of price dispersion as 
dependent variables. Our findings are not altered when we use different levels of industry 
aggregation to compute our market competition proxies. We obtain robust results in our OLS 
analysis with location and firm fixed effects as well as in the 2SLS regressions, where we 
account for possible endogeneity bias.  
Our findings are consistent with the theoretical literature that has studied the relation 
between price discrimination and competition (Holmes, 1989; Stole,1995, Rochet and Stole, 
2002). This literature defines the strong/weak market as the consumer segment in which the firm 
would optimally choose a higher/lower price. According to this theoretical literature the link 
between product competition and price discrimination depends critically on the intensity of brand 
preferences. More particularly, when consumers that buy the product with the highest price are 
relatively more brand loyal than those consumers that demand the product with the lowest price, 
then competitive forces drive down relatively more the lowest prices (Rochet and Stole, 2002). 
The opposite occurs when the weak market consumers are relatively more brand loyal (Stole, 
1995). In our study we find evidence that indeed strong market consumers are more price loyal 
than weak market consumers when companies choose to pursue strategies designed to enhance 
consumer willingness to pay through higher quality. 
This paper is also related to the work of Gerardi and Shapiro (2009). These authors 
replicate Borenstein and Rosse (1994) study for a more recent time period and they find a 
negative relationship between product competition and price dispersion in the airline industry 
rather than the positive association reported by the former authors, which, according to Gerardi 
and Shapiro (2009), may suffer from omitted variable bias. In our paper we show that even when 
correcting for the omitted variable bias, we can still find a positive effect of competition on price 
dispersion when we consider companies that pursue a differentiation strategy. Overall, our 
contribution to the IO literature is identifying empirically quality differentiation as a critical 
determinant to predict when competition will increase price discrimination as in Borenstein and 
Rose (1994) or decrease it as in Busse and Rysman (2005) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  the next section briefly describes the 
Spanish hotel industry. Section 3 explains how we have built the sample and the variables in our 
study. Section 4 discusses our identification strategy while Section 5 displays the main set of 
results and Section 6 adds several robustness tests and Section 7 concludes our paper.  
 
2.  The Hotel Industry in Spain 
 
Our data comes from the Spanish hospitality industry. According to the World Tourism 
Organization, in absolute terms Spain was the fourth largest tourist destination in the world with 
53 million international tourists in 2010, right after France, United States, and China. Tourism is 
the number one industry in Spain contributing to 10.3% of Spain’s GDP in 2010, according to 
the official figure provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). As discussed above, 
the Spanish hotel industry is a particularly appropriate context to conduct this study because it 
provides a rich setting across a large number of geographical locations with varying levels of 
competitive rivalry for which there are publicly available statistics of listed price menus and 
features for hotel differentiation. More importantly, the hospitality industry is an excellent 
framework to test our hypothesis because in this market we can find at any given point in time IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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companies that compete with widely distinct levels of quality across different locations. Namely, 
some hotels pursue a clearly observable differentiation strategy and focus their effort in selling 
high quality service to their consumer, while other hotels focus on low prices and basic services 
as their primary appeal to consumers. The level of quality can be easily observed in the number 
of stars allocated to the hotel, which is based on objective criteria used by the proper regional 
official agency.  
 
3.  Sample and Variable Construction  
 
We used the Official Hotel Guide published by the INE to build a panel of hotels for the 
five-year period 2004-2008. This Official Hotel Guide gathers annual information about the 
entire population of hotels in Spain, including its name, category (1-5 stars), chain membership, 
location (city and address), number of rooms, and prices for double and single rooms. Hotels 
send this information to the public Spanish agency Instituto de Estudios Turísticos, which is in 
charge of the promotion of tourism in Spain, both domestically and internationally. Hotels have a 
strong incentive to share this information accurately because this Guide is widely available to the 
general public, who often use it for planning their trips and choosing a hotel. Data from this 
guide has often been used by researchers in the Spanish hotel industry (Fernández and Marín, 
1998; Uriel and Ferri, 2004). Our final sample consists of data for 4,441 hotels for 5 years across 
1,698 locations, though missing data reduces sample size for some analyses. 
 
Variables 
- Room prices. Hotels report two key prices, i.e., for single and double rooms, which are 
used in our main models. We also estimate the relative difference between single and double 
rooms as a direct measure of price discrimination, defined as the double room price minus the 
single room price divided by the price of the double room price. It should be noted that the 
average number of rooms for the hotels in the sample is 81.64, but the hotels’ guest capacity is 
157.01 on average. About 96% of the hotel rooms in our sample can host two people, but they 
can be rented by single individuals usually at a discount; thus, the price difference between 
single and double rooms refers primarily to the number of customers using the room rather than 
intrinsic differences in rooms. 
We compute the independent variables about differentiation strategy and market 
competition in the following manner: 
- Category. The number of stars (coded 1 though 5) of the hotel is reported by the 
Official Guide. As a measure of vertical differentiation, this variable captures objectively the 
level of quality of the hotel based on industry regulations, which is officially assessed by the 
proper regional agency and displayed prominently by the hotel (Fernández and Marín,1998; 
Mazzeo, 2002).  
- Local competition. We used two variables that capture the degree of direct competition 
that a hotel has to face in its local market. First, Number of Competitors is a straightforward 
measure of the number of hotels in the same category (i.e., same number of stars) that exist in 
each one of the 1698 zip codes in the sample. This variable has been widely used in the literature 
as a proxy of market competition (see, for example, Stavins, 1995; Thomas and Weigelt, 2000 or 
Busse and Rysman, 2005). Second, we construct the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index 
(HFI) using the proportion of hotel rooms over total number of total rooms of the same category 
in the same zip code area as proxy of market share (Borenstein and Rosse, 1994 or Gerardi and IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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Shapiro, 2009).Note that both competition variables have variation within zip code because the 
number of hotels of different categories varies in each location. 
We controlled for differences across locations using location fixed effects and, in some 
models, hotel fixed effects. We also included the following control variables in the analysis to 
account for key features of the hotels as well as key changes in the locations throughout the 5-
year period: 
- Chain. This is a dummy variable that represents whether the hotel is part of a chain as 
reported in the Official Guide, such as NH, Hilton, Barceló, and Sol-Meliá. These chains have a 
common brand umbrella that guarantees some homogeneity in the type of service offered to 
consumers. Hotel chains that give their units the same name create the opportunity for repeat 
business, which gives the hotel chain an interest in satisfying the customer. This credible 
commitment of good service through the creation of a brand may increase the willingness to pay 
for travelers (Ingram, 1996), which should be controlled for. 
- Number of Rooms. We control for hotel size using the total number of rooms for each 
hotel. Hotel size may be expected to affect pricing policy, e.g., as a result of economies of scale.  
- Golf. To account for possible changes in the type of customers that are attracted to each 
location, we controlled for the number of golf courses in the location. According to the Real 
Federación Española de Golf, there were a total of 380 golf courses across Spain in December 
2008, which appeal to more affluent customers.  
- Conventions. We also control for the total number of hotels that provide meeting rooms 
for business customers and conventions in each location, as an indicator of the area’s 
attractiveness for business managers and professional travelers. 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
           
Single (€)  22205  79.94  54.62  9.35  620.00 
Double (€)  22205  108.82  66.99  15.70  766.00 
Price (€)  44410  94.38  62.80  9.35  766.00 
Difference (%)  22205  27.74  12.30  .00  71.11 
Lplayers  22205  1.14  1.07  .00  3.89 
HFI  22205  .53  .36  .03  1.00 
Category  22205  2.62  1.01  1.00  5.00 
Log of rooms  22205  3.85  1.06  1.10  7.04 
Chain  22205  .24  .43  0.00  1.00 
Golf courses  19180  .42  1.03  0.00  9.00 
Convention hotels  19180  5.21  5.99  0.00  30.00 
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Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for these variables. The average price of a single 
room is 79.94 euros and 108.92 euros for a double room, which results in an average discount of 
around 28% for single room use. Figure 1 shows the distribution of hotel category in our sample. 
Three stars is the most common category that comprises around 36% of the hotels in our sample. 
On the contrary, five star hotels represent only around 1.3% of our observations.  
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of hotels by category 
 
 
4.  Identification Strategy 
In the context of firms that sell a menu of differentiated products, price discrimination is 
usually defined as the existence of price variation that cannot be explained by cost differences. 
For example, publishing companies sell the same content of books in both hard cover and 
paperback format with a large difference in price. The literature considers this as an example of 
price discrimination because this price divergence is not driven by cost discrepancies (Clerides, 
2002). In this regard there is some mild controversy about how to properly translate this 
definition into the empirical work. Some authors define price discrimination to exist when 
absolute differences between price-cost markups are unequal while others look at percentage 
differences (Clerides, 2004).  
We believe that hotel pricing for single and double use of the same room is indeed an 
example of price discrimination. As we discussed earlier, about 96% of the rooms in our sample 
can be rented for single or double use, but the room itself does not change. The key significant IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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difference is for the customer to share the physical space in the room with another person. 
Though it could be argued that a room shared by two customers may have somewhat higher costs 
of cleaning and replacing basic amenities like coffee, soap, or toilet paper, this slightly greater 
cost of service cannot explain the average relative price difference of 28% between single and 
double use of a room. Moreover, the difference between single and double room prices across 
hotels does not seem to be explained by cost differences because, as we explain in the following 
section, the price difference is smaller for those hotels of higher quality, precisely those hotels in 
which the cost of serving one more person should be the highest.  
When choosing the price menu for single and double use of the same room, hotels engage 
in indirect price discrimination. Two people thinking in booking a room in a given hotel x, may 
choose to book two single-use rooms or just one double-use depending on the relative prices and 
their unobservable preferences for extra room space. If so, we can model the utility of any given 





Where   and  represent respectively the utility of booking two rooms for individual 
use and one room with double use; t(q) denotes the unobserved couple preference for space that 
depends on the hotel quality q; S is the space available for the couple if they rent two rooms,   
and  represent prices for single and double use of the room and x represents an unobserved 
taste of the couple for the hotel x. With this specification, what we investigate in the empirical 
sections is whether the extra incentive to pay for more space is positively or negatively 
associated to the levels of individual hotel loyalty for distinct levels of hotel quality. In other 
words we are testing whether cov(t(q), x(q))>0 for hotels with high q as it happens in Rochet and 
Stole (2002) or cov(t(q), x(q))<0 for hotels of the lowest quality as in Stole (1995). 
However, our empirical strategy needs to address the fact that we do not observe the 
marginal costs of production, though we do not expect these marginal costs of single and double 
rooms to vary significantly. For this analysis, we follow Busse and Rysman (2005) and we 
estimate the asymmetric effect on both price types of variations in market competition. Hence 
our identification strategy relies on the assumption that variation of competition does not affect 
marginal costs of servicing distinct types of hotel rooms. 
More precisely we estimate a linear functional form:  
  (1) 
Where   is the price of hiring a room of type k in hotel i that operates in location L at 
year t; k is the type of room (single-use or double-use);  is measured using the 
number of hotels of the same category operating in the same location as well as the 
corresponding Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.   is computed by the number of 
stars of the hotel. Finally,   represents time effects common across all hotels and   are hotel 
characteristics invariant across time. We assume that   is i.i.d. and independent of the rest of 
the left hand side variables.  
We are interested in estimating whether market competition affects asymmetrically the 
price of single-use versus double-use of the room and how this asymmetric response depends on 
the hotel differentiation strategy. More specifically we hypothesize: 
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           (2) 
 
If we substitute (2) into (1) we get: 
(3) 
 
We further assume that   is independent of type of room, k, and the Competition 
variables. Below we will estimate (3) using time fixed effects to account for   and location fixed 
effects to avoid biases coming from L. Therefore the remaining error term will be composed by 
. This error term indicates both the presence of heteroskedasticity 
(higher variance for those observations belonging to the same hotel and/or sharing the same 
room type) and autocorrelation of observations belonging to the same hotel since 
 and  .  
For these reasons in our regressions below we use different econometric specifications 
that ensure that our results are not driven by any misspecification in our empirical analysis. More 
precisely, we run two distinct sets of regressions. One set of regressions will display clustered 
standard errors at the hotel level, also controlling for location fixed effects. This will make sure 
that autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of observations belonging to the same hotel are not 
influencing the statistical significance of our coefficients. In additional analyses we also include 
hotel fixed effects that control for any differences across hotels. When we use this more 
demanding specification, we cannot include location fixed effects because hotels do not 
physically change location, though hotels can close down and their management open up a new 
one in another place. In this specification we use robust standard errors and bootstrapping to 
ensure that our standard errors are not affected by any type of heteroskedasticity.   
Finally, it could be the case that – contrary to our identification assumptions- the term 
 is not independent of the level of competition faced by hotel i at time t. This would be the 
case if unobserved shifts in demand across time for a given location would drive at the same time 
higher prices and a larger number of competitors. In the empirical analysis below we show how 
this endogeneity bias does not seem to be important since we report negative correlations 
between our competition proxies and price levels. However, we alleviate further endogeneity 
concerns by reporting estimations using instrumental variables. We estimate two-stage least 
square regressions using as instrumental variables the local regulations for each category 
regarding room size, bath and elevator. These local regulations make harder or easier to acquire a 
given number of stars and, therefore, they constitute good instruments for the number of 
competitors in a given location and category. 
 
5.  Estimation and Results 
Differentiation and Prices 
We start by exploring the interplay between quality differentiation and hotel prices. Table 
2 shows average price levels for single and double rooms for hotels with different number of 
stars. Obviously, hotels with higher quality also demand higher room prices. The price of a 
double-occupancy room for a hotel with one star is around €58, but the price for a five-star hotel IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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jumps to €318. More interestingly, the difference between single and double room prices gets 
reduced for higher levels of differentiation; the difference between both prices is around 30% for 
hotels with one star and only 19% for five-star hotels. Close to 10% of five-star hotels in our 
sample have a single use room price identical to the double use price, yet this only happens for 
2% of hotels with one star. Overall, we take these figures as informal evidence that these 
observed price differences are lower when -presumably- cost differences should be higher, this 
is, when the hotel has a higher quality service.  Thus, we believe that differences in the marginal 
cost of providing the service do not explain the gap between single use and double use of the 
same room and there is indeed substantial price discrimination in the hotel industry in the prices 
charged for single vs. double occupancy of rooms. 
 
TABLE 2 Mean prices and differences by category 
 
   








Hotels with same 
price (%) 
 1 star  3550  40.75  58.44  30.46  1.90 
 2 stars  6141  51.70  72.61  29.22  1.59 
 3 stars  8060  82.48  113.36  27.65  2.15 
 4 stars  4160  137.89  181.67  24.01  4.53 
 5 stars  294  253.11  318.45  18.89  9.69 
 Overall  22205  79.94  108.82  27.74  2.50 
 
Difference (%) is the price of a double room minus the single room price divided by the price of 
a double room. 
 
Hotels with same price (%) is the percentage of hotels that charge the same price for the single or 
double occupancy of a room. 
 
 
Competition and Prices 
Figure 2 shows how the degree of competition that the hotels in our sample face varies 
across time. Any given year there is around 11-15% of our locations, measured by zip code, with 
an increase in the number of hotels and between 3.4% and 5% of locations that experience a 
decrease in the number of competitors. In the empirical analysis below we exploit this source of 
variability in market competition to estimate the effect of competition on hotel pricing policies. 
In addition to this variation of competition across time, we also exploit within location variability 
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The basic relationship between competition and prices can be seen in Tables 3A and 3B. 
These tables display the results of estimating a set of regressions in which the dependent variable 
is either the price of a room for single use or the price for a double-use room. We run these 
regressions both pooling the data of the five years in our sample and using year-by-year cross-
sections. Without exception, all the coefficients associated with our main proxy of market 
competition (Number of competitors in the same zip and HFI) are statistically significant and 
display the expected sign, although competition seems to impact somewhat more the price for 
double rooms than the price for single rooms. For example, using the coefficients of model (6) in 
Tables 3A and 3B, we can estimate that an increase of two standard deviations in the natural 
logarithm of number of competitors (Lplayers) would imply an average decrease in prices of 
around €12 for single use and €15 for the double use of the room. To avoid flooding the paper 
with tables, we provide the results for our second measure of competition (HFI) only for the 
entire 2004-08 period, but the coefficient is always positive and significant in every single year 
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2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2004-08 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
















































































HFI              8.01** 
(3.55) 
Location d.  1608  1578  1639  1640  1642  1698  1698 
Year d.            4  4 
AdjR
2  .62  .60  .60  .60  .60  .73  .73 
N  3671 
 
3695  3930  3933  3951  19180  19180 
 
Dependent variable: Single room price. 
***, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas. 
Observations clustered by location in yearly analysis and by hotel in panel analysis. IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 









2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2004-08 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 



















































































1608  1578  1639  1640  1642  1698  1698 
Year du.            4  4 
AdjR
2  .62  .60  .59  .59  .60  .73  .72 
N  3671 
 
3695  3930  3933  3951  19180  19180 
 
Dependent variable: Double room price. 
***, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively. 
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas. 
Observations clustered by location in yearly analysis and by hotel in panel analysis. IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 






We now turn to the main goal of the paper, i.e., how the linkage between market 
competition and price discrimination varies depending on the degree of firm differentiation. 
Before resorting to fully fledged econometric techniques, we start analyzing the data by looking 
at simple correlations. Table 4 shows some preliminary evidence that the relationship between 
competition and price differences depends on the quality of hotels. The zero-order correlation 
between competition (Lplayers and HFI) is substantially smaller and the opposite sign for one 
and two star hotels than for four and five star hotels. This informal evidence suggests that 
competition is indeed negatively associated with price differences between single and double 
rooms for hotels with lower quality, but it is positively associated for hotels with higher quality. 
 
 
TABLE 4 Zero-order correlations between competition and price difference 
 
   
Lplayers & Difference 
 
HFI & Difference 
1 & 2 stars hotels  -.05***  .04*** 
4 & 5 stars hotels  .24***  -.20*** 
 
 
We proceed next to estimate (3) to confirm this preliminary evidence. Table 5 displays 
the results for our two measures of competition and clustering the observations that belong to the 
same hotel in the panel analysis. Models 1 to 3 employ the natural log of the number of 
competitors (Lplayers) as proxy of market competition while Models 4 to 6 repeat the same 
regressions but utilizing the Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index (HFI). In all models the 
dependent variable is hotel room price, using Type as a dummy variable for single room 
(Type=0) and double room (Tyep=1). Not surprisingly, hotels of higher category command 
significant higher prices, while the main effect of competition on hotel prices is negative and 
significant, based on both Lplayers and HFI. Model 3 of Table 5 shows how the interaction of 
Lplayers with Type of room exhibits a positive sign. Similarly, Model 6 shows that type of the 
room and competition has a negative sign when using HFI as proxy of product competition. Both 
interaction terms, contrary to but smaller than the main effect of competition, indicate that in the 
absence of differentiation, market competition decreases relatively more room prices for double 
use than single use prices and, therefore, reduces firm capability to price discriminate. This is 
consistent with the findings of Busse and Rysman (2005) that show how market competition 
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TABLE 5 Room price regressions, panel analysis 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 


























































































     




     
Category*Lplayers      -.36 
(1.00) 
     
Category*Type      6.55*** 
(.66) 
    13.24*** 
(.90) 
Type*Lplayers*Category      2.74*** 
(.49) 
     










Category* HFI            -.48 
(2.60) 
Type* HFI*Category            -7.05*** 
(1.35) 
Location Dummies   1698  1698  1698  1698  1698  1698 
Year Dummies   4   4   4   4   4   4  
AdjR
2  .73  .73  .74  .73  .73  .74 
N  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360 
 
Dependent variable: Room price.  
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas. Observations are clustered by hotel. 
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Yet, when we consider the interactions between competition, category, and room type in 
Models 3 and 6, we see that for higher category hotels, the negative effect of competition on 
prices is lower for double rooms than for single rooms, thus increasing price differences between 
single and double rooms. In other words, the Type*Lplayers interaction is moderated by the 
hotel category, as captured by the three-way interaction term Type*Lplayers*Category. This 
means that for more differentiated hotels competition increases significantly the ability to price 
discriminate, which is consistent with the findings of Borenstein and Rose (1994), who report 
that more competition is associated with higher price dispersion in the airline industry.  
As three-way interactions may be difficult to interpret, we show in Table 6 simpler 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the relative difference between single-use and 
double-use prices. The two proxies of competition do not have a significant effect on the relative 
price difference between single and double rooms in Models 1 and 3, but the results from Models 
2 and 4 in Table 6 confirm that indeed competition reduces price differences for hotels with 
lower quality and, in contrast, it increases price differences for hotels of higher category. 
 
TABLE 6 Price difference regressions 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 




















































   
Category*Lplayers    .011*** 
(.002) 
   




Category*HFI        -.027*** 
(.006) 
Location Dummies   1698  1698  1698  1698 
Year Dummies   4  4  4  4 
R
2  .45  .45  .45  .45 
N  19180  19180  19180  19180 
 
Dependent variable: Double room price minus single room price divided by double room price.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas. Observations clustered by hotel. 
 
Overall, we interpret all of these results as clear evidence that the extent of differentiation 
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low differentiation in quality, as it arguably happens in the yellow pages industry studied by 
Busse and Rysman (2005), market competition decreases price discrimination, which we observe 
for hotels with 1 and 2 stars in our sample. In contrast, for firms with higher differentiation in 
quality (i.e., higher category hotels), market competition increases price discrimination, as 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) found in the airline industry, where differentiation was critical, 
especially before the growth of the low-cost carriers. 
 
6.  Robustness tests 
In this section we conduct several robustness tests of our results to distinct econometric 
specifications and with different definitions of our competition and differentiation variables. 
  
TABLE 7 Room price regressions by year 
 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 




































































































Location Dummies   1608  1578  1639  1640  1642 
AdjR
2  .72  .71  .70  .70  .70 
N  7342  7390  7860  7866  7902 
 
Dependent variable: Room price. 
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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***, **, * denote significant coefficient at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas. 
Observations clustered by location. 
 
First, given the use of location fixed effects, our results above were found using two 
different sources of variability of our competition variable: variability of local competition across 
time and within location variation of competition, because the number of the same category 
competitors differs within a given location. We explore whether our results are robust to consider 
exclusively only one type of variability. For this, we first repeat the estimation of (3) using 5 
cross-sections corresponding to each year in our sample. In this analysis the only source of 
variation in competition is within location. Table 7 reports the estimation of these cross-section 
regressions using Lplayers as proxy of competition (results for HFI are analogous). Though there 
are some minor differences across years, the triple interaction coefficients remain significant and 
negative each year. Thus, the results are qualitatively the same as in Table 5, which we interpret 
as evidence that our conclusions are not exclusively driven by across time variation of 
competition, particularly for the triple interaction. 
Next, we take the opposite approach and we investigate whether our findings may be 
driven by within location variation of competition. For this purpose we construct competition 
variables that do not have within location variation. This is the same source of variation that 
Busse and Rysman (2005) employ to identify their results. More explicitly, we compute the 
number of competitors and HFI per zip code regardless of their category. Note that with these 
variables and location fixed effects the only variation of competition that identifies our results 
would be across time. Models (1) and (2) in Table 8 display the results of estimating our main set 
of regressions with the modified competition variables. Once more, we find qualitatively the 
same results as above, most critically for the triple interaction. 
We also investigate how our results may vary if we change geographic boundaries to 
define hotel competitors. For this analysis, we use four-digit ZIP code rather than five-digit to 
identify all variables associated with geographical scope. The results of running the regressions 
with this enlarged market competition variables are shown in Models 3 and 4 in Table 8, where 
we find similar results to those we obtained before. 
Finally, in all our specifications we use clustered standard errors at the hotel level to 
properly estimate standard errors. Yet this does not preclude that the existence of unobserved 
hotel characteristics correlated at the same time with prices, differentiation, and competition 
could be driving the results. It may be the case that an unobserved variable induces a given 
location to become particularly appealing for consumers of certain category hotels. If this is the 
case, consumers may be willing to pay a higher price for hotels of that category in that location 
and at the same time more hotels of that same category would be attracted to the location, driven 
by higher expected profitability. Therefore, this type of endogeneity bias would prompt a 
positive association between our product competition variables and price levels. With this 
possibility in mind, we estimate (3) using hotel fixed effects. The results are displayed in Table 
9. Models 1 and 3 show the results with standard errors clustered by hotel while in Models 2 and 
4 we report bootstrapped standard errors. 
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TABLE 8: Room price regressions with alternative definitions of competition and location  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
























































Lplayers  -10.41*** 
(2.70) 
  -12.46*** 
(2.36) 
 
Type*Lplayers  -2.47** 
(1.03) 
  -2.67** 
(.89) 
 
Category*Lplayers  2.95*** 
(.85) 
  1.35 
(.86) 
 








Type*Lplayers*Category  1.98*** 
(.44) 
  1.85*** 
(.36) 
 
HFI    51.51*** 
(9.97) 
  30.34*** 
(6.66) 
Type*HFI    8.21** 
(4.01) 
  7.45*** 
(2.76) 
Category* HFI    -17.58*** 
(3.87) 
  -3.07 
(2.58) 
Type* HFI*Category    -6.86*** 
(1.83) 
  -5.64*** 
(1.21) 
Location Dummies   1698  1698  1109  1109 
Year Dummies   4  4  4  4 
AdjR
2  .74  .74  .70  .70 
N  38360  38360  38360  38360 
Dependent variable: Room price.  
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas in Models 1 & 2 and 4-digit in Models 3 & 4.  
In Models 1 & 2 competitions proxies, Lplayers and HFI, are computed based on the hotels in 
each five-digit ZIP code regardless of their category. 
In Models 3 & 4 all variables affected by location scope (Lplayers, HFI, Golf, and Convention) 
are computed based on 4-digit zip areas. 
Observations clustered by hotel. IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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Again, we find similar results as those reported above for both proxies of competition, 
Lplayers and HFI, especially for the three-way interaction that constitutes the main focus of our 
analysis. These results confirm our finding that the relationship between market competition and 
price dispersion is critically moderated by the hotel category.  
 
 
TABLE 9 Room price regressions with hotel fixed effects  
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 




























































   




   




   












   
















Hotel Dummies   4054  4054  4054  4054 
Year Dummies   4  4  4  4 
AdjR
2  .92  .92  .92  .92 
N  38360  38360  38360  38360 
 IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
19 
 
Dependent variable: Room price.  
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient.  
Hotel fixed effects for all models. 
Clustered standard errors by hotel for models 1 and 3.  Bootstrapped standard errors for models 2 and 4. 
 
Next, we alleviate further endogeneity concerns by estimating (3) using instrumental 
variable regressions. We want to check that our results are not driven by omitted variable biases, 
such as shifts in demand preferences that could jointly determine room prices and competition. 
For this, we exploit the regional regulation of hotel category that characterizes the Spanish 
hospitality industry. The local requirements to grant a determined number of stars are not 
uniform across Spanish regions and we use these distinct requirements to construct instrumental 
variables for our market competitions proxies. More explicitly we utilize the following 
instruments:  
- Reg_elevator: The requirement of having an elevator to grant a given hotel category in stars 
varies across regions. For example, in the local region of Murcia the firm is not regarded as a one 
star hotel (vs. pension or hostel with lower level of required services) unless the building has an 
elevator, provided that the hotel has two or more floors. On the contrary, in the region of 
Navarra, a one-star hotel does not require the presence of an elevator unless the hotel has four 
floors or more. We exploit this regulatory source of variation in competition levels across 
geographical regions by creating a variable, reg_elevator, whose value is equal to the number of 
floors that require an elevator according to local regulations for its category. 
- Reg_bath: Local regulations differ in the minimum prerequisites about percentage of rooms 
with complete bathrooms to qualify for any number of stars. For example, in the Balearic 
Islands, three-star hotels are not required to have any percentage of rooms with complete 
bathrooms. On the contrary, in the Canary Islands, all three-star hotels should have a 100% of 
rooms with complete bathrooms. This variable captures the percentage of rooms required to have 
a complete bathroom inside for each category. 
- Reg_room: Finally, there is regional variation on the requisites about living room size. For 
instance, while in the region of Madrid five-star hotels are not demanded to have any minimum 
size, in the Andalusia region a five-star hotel should have a living room whose size is at least 
equal to 4 square meters per host. We compute this variable as the minimum size of the hotel 
living room as measured by the required number of square meters per host for each category.  
These distinct regulatory requirements influence the costs needed to qualify for any given 
hotel category. A distinct value of all three regulatory variables should influence the costs of 
operating a hotel. As a result, they introduce exogenous changes in the number of competitors of 
a given category and this is why they are excellent instruments for our competition proxies. Their 
value depends on which of the seventeen Spanish regions the hotel is located as well as the 
corresponding hotel category (from one to five stars). Table 10 displays descriptive statistics of 
these instrumental variables. 
  
TABLE 10 Descriptive statistics of instrumental variables 
  Mean  Std 
Reg_elevator  1.03  .19 
Reg_room  2.14  1.08 
Reg_bath  98.98  9.89 IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 




































Constant  1.06***  .07  .09  .26  .48***  -.02  -.14  -.09 
Type  -.05  1.01***  .24  -.07  -.00  .51***  -.08  -.08 
Category  -.25***  -.16***  .24*  -.53***  .12**  .04***  .89***  .15*** 
Category*Type   -.02  .02  -.10  1.13***  .00  .03  .04  .63*** 
Lrooms  .00***  .00***  .01***  .00***  .00  .00  -.00***  -.00*** 
Chain  -.04  -.02  -.09  -.04  .00  .00  -.02  -.01 
Golf  .04***  .02***  .14***  .07***  -.03***  -.01***  -.08***  -.04*** 
Convention  .13***  .06***  .39***  .19***  -.04***  -.02***  -.10***  -.05*** 
Reg elevator  -.47***  -.08**  -.13  -.28**  .19***  .02**  .07  .08** 
Reg elevator*cat  .10***  .08***  -.15  .27***  -.05**  -.02***  .03  -.08*** 
Reg elevator*type  -.04**  -.34***  -.00  .46  .02**  .16***  -.01  -.10 
Reg elevator*cat*type  .01  -.07  -.03*  -.74***  -.00  -.01  .01  .20*** 
Reg bath  .00  -.00  -.01***  -.00  .00  .00  .00  .00 
Reg bath*cat  .00  -.00**  .00***  -.00**  -.00  .00**  -.00**  .00** 
Reg bath* type  .00  .00  -.00  -.01  -.00  -.00  .00  .00 
Reg bath*cat*type  -.00  .00**  .00*  .01***  .00  -.00*  -.00  -.00*** 
Reg room  -.04***  -.00  -.10***  -.01  .01***  .00  .02**  .00 
Reg room*cat
i  --  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  ---  --- 
Reg room*type  -.04  -.11***  -.06  -.17**  .00  .02  .01  .04 
Reg room*cat*type  .01  .02*  .02  .03  -.00  -.00  -.00  -.01 
Year 
Dummies  
4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
AdjR
2  .61  .57  .70  .61  .41  .63  .52  .63 























ii   4.26***  2.70***  3.65***  3.27***  2.26**  1.70*  1.97**  2.70*** 
N  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360  38360 
 
 
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Observations clustered by hotel.  
i Omitted because of collinearity. 
ii Angrist-Pischke multivariate F test of excluded instruments 
 
Table 11A displays the results of the first stage regressions of the 2SLS in which the 
dependent variables are our competition proxies as well as their interactions with hotel 
differentiation and room type. Table 11B reports the corresponding estimates of the second stage 
regression in which again we find that market competition seems to reduce (increase) the ability 
of low (high) category hotels to price discriminate. Note that the F tests of excluded instruments IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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and the Angrist-Pischke multivariate tests reported in Table 11A indicate that none of the 
estimates of endogenous variables suffer from a weak instrument bias (Stock, Wright and Yogo, 
2002) when we use log of players as proxy of market competition. When we employ the 
Herfindahl Index we can also reject the presence of weak instrument biases, although in this case 
the Angrist-Pischke test is only marginally significant for the coefficient that estimates   in (3).  
 
 
TABLE 11B Room 2SLS price regressions, second stage 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
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Year Dummies   4   
 
4  4 
AdjR
2  .01  .02  .12  .12 
N  38360  38360  38360  38360 
 
Dependent variable: Room price.  
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient.  
Observations clustered by hotel for models 1 and 3.  




We discuss now whether there might be additional unobserved factors that could explain 
our findings, especially with regard to hotel costs. Most hotel costs - like the real state cost and 
building and decorating the hotel- are fixed costs of production that do not depend on the number 
of customers. These fixed costs could be affected by competition in the marketplace since a large 
number of hotels may drive up real estate prices as well as the cost of construction and 
decorating. However, most of these fixed costs should not have an impact on room prices since 
most of our hotels have been built years before our sample period and, therefore, changes in 
competition should be unrelated to any changes in the fixed portion of hotel costs.  
Yet, it could be the case that some hotels have undertaken a major reform in our sample 
period whose costs might have been higher in more competitive locations, but even in this case 
the costs of servicing single and double use of the same room should be equally affected and, 
therefore, this type of unobserved factor should not explain our results.  
Another possibility is that competition in the marketplace may increase hotel variable 
costs. These variable costs are mainly the personnel needed to clean and maintain the rooms and 
its main component is unskilled workers’ compensation. It could be the case that an increase in 
competition in a given location generates higher demand for unskilled labor that translates in a 
local increase of wages per hour. These higher costs may affect proportionally more 
differentiated hotels that offer higher quality service that is more labor intensive. Hence, the 
increase in labor costs may affect proportionally more the prices of double rooms especially in 
more differentiated hotels. However, we do not believe that this alternative explanation is 
actually driving the results. On the one hand, the greater costs of maintaining a double room are 
likely to be only minimally greater than the costs of maintaining a room that was used only by 
one guest. On the other hand, we obtained similar results when we explicitly controlled for 
average wages in the hospitality industry in each geographical area. With this purpose we cross 
our dataset with data coming from the administrative records of the Spanish Social Security, 
more precisely the 2006 wave of the Spanish Continuous Sample of Working Histories (CSWH) 
(“Muestra Contínua de Vidas Laborales”). This dataset is formed by a 4% random sample of all 
individuals who have had an affiliation with the Spanish Social Security during 2006
1
                                                 
1 We thank the generosity of Daniel Fernández-Kranz in providing us with these data. 
. Because 
the data for hotel wages is only available for the largest locations, the number of observations 
drops to 16,412 hotel/years. In Table 12 we replicate our estimation of (3) above including as a IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
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control local hospitality wages obtaining the same qualitative results as above. The impact of 




TABLE 12 Room price regressions controlling for local labor costs 
  Model 1  Model 2 
































Lplayers  -1.17 
(2.86) 
 
Type*Lplayers  -2.70** 
(1.32) 
 
Category*Lplayers  -1.30 
(1.07) 
 




Type*Lplayers*Category  2.08*** 
(.53) 
 
HFI    3.74 
(7.67) 
Type*HFI    5.88 
(3.37)* 
Category* HFI    1.51 
(2.86) 
Type* HFI*Category    -5.37*** 
(1.47) 
Location Dummies   1125  1125 
Year Dummies   4   4  
AdjR
2  .76  .76 
N  16412  16412 
Dependent variable: Room price.  IE Business School Working Paper               DE8-138-I                                 31/08/2011 
E Business School Working Paper       WP10-04               09/07/2010 
24 
 
Type is equal to one when the price corresponds to a double-use of the room.  
**, **, * denote significant coefficients at .01, .05 & .10 level respectively.  
Standard errors in parenthesis below each coefficient. 
Location dummies assigned to 5-digit zip areas.  
Observations are clustered by hotel. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
In the context of the Spanish hospitality industry this paper provides strong empirical 
evidence that the linkage between product market competition and price discrimination crucially 
depends on firm differentiation strategies. For those companies that sell a service of relatively 
higher quality, product market competition is associated with more price discrimination while 
the opposite happens for companies that offer an undifferentiated service. 
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